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For now ſits Expectation in the Air.

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THE CRISIS.

THE problematic ſtate of Europe being now, we hope, at the eve of a happy ſolution, it calls upon every man of ſenſe and property to give his thoughts ſo far a political turn, as to enquire on what foundation the preſent war is conſtructed, what plan is propoſed for the conducting it, and what may be the probable iſſue.

It is unneceſſary here to ſhew how deeply intereſted Great Britain is in the event; an event in which every man of property is intimately concerned for his poſſeſſions, and every man without poſſeſſions for his liberty: both muſt floriſh or fade, as the

war is well founded, purſued with ſpirit, and finiſhed with addreſs.

As we muſt engage in a war, in which nothing but the fate of arms can give either ſide the advantage, it naturally leads us to conſider what treaties are made, what alliances formed, what forces are allotted to balance the adverſe power, and with what ſtock of wealth, or by what judicious meaſures, ſuch a war is to be ſupported.

A great depth of politics ſeems not requiſite to comprehend that the ſkill, addreſs, ſituation, attention, and cautious conduct of the king of Pruſſia commands the regard of every curious eye; and that without a third part of the dominions or forces of ſome other monarchs, ſeems yet to hold the ſcales wherein is balanced the fate of kingdoms; not by his own force, but by judiciouſly uniting with ſuch powers, as without him are faint, but with him have, at leaſt, the appearance of conſiderable ſuperiority. Hence reflecting in what a ſingular manner the preſent war has commenced, a prudent man naturally concludes, that this monarch is ſpecially engaged in the Britiſh alliance. In my own mind,

mind, I am fully perſuaded, that he is ſo engaged; as I would not preſume the minuteſt want of diſcretion in our miniſtry, or that they would ſet the fate of this crown and kingdom on a leſs hazard, ſo neither ſhould I merit credit in this particular, did I not propoſe to ſupport theſe ſugeſtions by certain facts.

There has long been a real, or ſeeming difference between the courts of London and Berlin, the grounds of which, and the cauſe of its continuance, is not immediately to my preſent purpoſe; but it may not be impertinent to ſhew how a change has been brought about as introductory to the preſent ſyſtem.

It is ſome few years paſt, that a certain noble perſonage, ſince removed to another court, in a free converſation with his P—n M——y, hinted the neceſſity and uſe of a friendly union, not only between the reſpective electorates, but alſo with the court of L——n, as the moſt natural means of putting a full ſtop to the encroachments and over-bearing power of France, which by degrees would probably as much endanger Germany hereafter, as it did now the Auſtrian Netherlands. That prince

 replied,

replied, " Your obſervation is very juſt,
" and you only in this repeat, what ſprung
" originally from the penetrating genius
" of my late couſin king William; it is
" indeed in itſelf very obvious, and would
" naturally take place, was not the houſe
" of Auſtria as much too powerful for me at
" preſent, as France may be for the whole
" Empire in the future; and as it is evident-
" ly my intereſt that neither be too potent,
" ſo it is that I can always command the aſ-
" ſiſtance of one or the other. And as
" the intereſts of the courts of L—n and
" V—a are intimately connected, and Si-
" leſia not under the ſecurity of a gua-
" rantee, it would induce any man of com-
" mon ſenſe in the like caſe, to act in the
" favour of that power, from whom he
" has moſt to hope, and leaſt to fear. On
" the contrary, whenever I can reconcile
" to my underſtanding the meaſures of the
" court of V—a in reſpect to me, all the
" reſt would naturally follow.—— You
" ſee of what little uſe the N——ds are to
" the h—e of A—a, they neither barrier
" the D—h, improve trade, nor produce
" ſignificant revenues. L——n, &c. are
" the native right of the E——r, and the
" Nether-

" Netherlands in proper hands would be " of excellent ſervice to the alliance that " might be formed, and into which his " S——n M——y ought to be aſſiduouſly " courted, in which light ſomething might " be effected for the common benefit."

This converſation, 'tis ſaid, was communicated to a certain gentleman then in power, whoſe diſcretion was never queſtioned, but had preſcribed himſelf particular bounds, beyond which, he had determined never to adventure; and therefore, while he admired the thought, he declined engaging in what appeared to him too complex an enterprize: but did not at the ſame time decline a farther communication of the ſubject matter to his intimate friends in whom he ſingularly confided, and mentioned it as an affair that might probably ſucceed under the direction of a more bold and ſpirited m——r. As matters of this kind, in whatever prudent hands entruſted, are apt gradually to tranſpire in looſe hints and obſcure reflections, the meaning was underſtood by more than one, long before any opening in the c——l, or the ſcheme in any ſenſe ripe for execution; and in conſequence, various plans formed in the

cloſets

cloſets of different political deſigners: but that which fired the imagination of all who were admitted into the ſecret, was framed by a gentleman too well known in the political world, and his ſuperior knowledge of foreign affairs, to need any mention in this place. The eſſence of which is,

" That an alliance be formed wherein " the king of Pruſſia be made a leading " party, to detach him from France—Pro- " poſe a certain ſhare of the Auſtrian Ne- " therlands and a ſea port.——The houſe " of Auſtria equivalent diſtricts in Al- " ſace and election of the Arch-duke.—— " That the king of Pruſſia command the " allied troops in the Netherlands, and " that the whole power of the houſe of " Auſtria may be enabled to act on the " ſide of Alſace. Subſidial troops muſt be " obtained from Denmark, Saxony, or " Ruſſia, and the king of Sardinia enga- " ged to defend the imperial dominions in " Italy. His ſhare to be, &c. what is not " proper at preſent to mention." It happened very luckily for this ſcheme, that a certain prince had reaſons enough to acquit himſelf of all former obligations to the

the power with whom he had been long engaged, as having been treated at once with a deceit and narrowneſs, that is hardly to be parallel'd at any time in ſimilar caſes, and would but ill ſuit the diſpoſition of a perſon who was not only an exact performer of treaties himſelf, but alſo ſuch a judicious oeconomiſt, as to make his revenues exactly coincide with his undertakings, without running the ſtate in debt, or being, on caſual emergencies, at any loſs for proper reſources: therefore, whenever his finances failed by the pitifulneſs or poverty of his capital ally, it affected him in a very different manner than it would have done any other prince, not equally delicate in point of reputation. And as what was now propoſed appearing to him infinitely preferable to his former engagements, as being an independant acquiſition balanced againſt uncertainty and dependance, a perſon ſo diſcerning could not doubt which was moſt eligible.

In this ſituation it was very perceivable, to a common eye, what muſt neceſſarily be the reſult; for as on the one ſide, the troops of the allies by much outnumber thoſe of France by land, ſo does the Britiſh

tiſh navy that of France by ſea. And while the forces of France cannot be drawn to the ſouthward, it is evident with what facility the king of Sardinia will ſupport himſelf and defend Italy. For, however it may be matter of converſation, that the court of France have ſeveral hundred thouſand men in pay, there are few who reflect, that if no part of this great body ſhall be able to traverſe beyond their native boundaries, or live on their adverſaries at diſcretion, the finances of France will not be long able to ſupport them, ſo that the good or evil of ſuch numbers eſſentially depends on the meaſures taken by thoſe who are, or ought to be properly prepared. And I ſhould think, that however careleſs other ſtates may be in this particular, it materially concerns the court of Berlin to be ſuitably provided; and as that court has never yet failed on like occaſions, it is an idle preſumption even to ſuppoſe it will, at ſo important and delicate a criſis, when the fate of Europe is in effect ſtaked againſt the courage, addreſs, and fortunes of France. At all events, neceſſity has put us upon making the experiment, and I hope ſhall not on

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our parts fail in duely executing our engagements, either by a faint war, or an untimely or indiſcreet peace, as the ſame reaſons will not paſs with the people as heretofore, " the pretence of wanting money:" for, were that true, how came we ſo ſoon enabled to engage in a freſh war, with a proſpect before us of adding at leaſt, thirty millions more to the public debt? And tho' I muſt confeſs that the proſpect of a future debt, doth not in my eye preponderate againſt the happy effects that may be probably conſequential of the preſent plan; yet, as it is eaſy to forſee what uſe will be made of ſome mens conduct in caſe the war proves unſucceſsful, I can't help thinking it the moſt bold and daring adventure, that has ever been enterprized; ſoftened however by this, that the people deſire a war with France, but without either calculating the expence, or giving themſelves the trouble even to conjecture the conſequence; and as the unſteddineſs of the multitude is well known to all who reflect with any depth of attention, ſo notwithſtanding the preſent plan may be the happieſt that was ever deſigned, and I hope, will be attended with the ſucceſs it

juſtly merits, yet as matters of this nature is like navigating in uncertain climates, amongſt rocks, ſhoals, and quickſands; ſo it may not be in the power of the ableſt pilot to extricate himſelf from the danger, it not ſo much depending on wit, ſpirit, and judgment, as on favourable and friendly weather.

In the formation of this ſcheme, a great extent of genius was not in any ſenſe requiſite; it being ſimply plain, that neither the court of Vienna, nor the ſtates of Holland, either could, or would in earneſt, ſupport a barrier againſt France. The next reflection was very natural, that the French would ſoon be maſters of the Netherlands, by that means open a free paſſage into Germany on that ſide, and at the ſame time either be abſolute maſters of the ſeven united provinces, or at leaſt ſo powerful a neighbour as always to direct their meaſures.

This nobody could perceive better than the king of Pruſſia, whoſe inclination at once to ſave Hanover and Holland, exactly coincides with the notions of the Britiſh miniſtry; there was no great difficulty in bringing thoſe together, whoſe ſentiments were

were previouſly union'd: eſpecially as there was not any thing in this ſcheme, that might eventually draw Great Britain into an unneceſſary expence to defend what is in effect her own frontier, but only gratifying the undertaker with ſuch poſſeſſions, as no other neighbour ſovereign could with any advantage enjoy, becauſe the wealth that was raiſed from, and ſhould have defended them, was otherwiſe diſpoſed. But here we ſee a prince his own miniſter and diſpoſer, not the dupe of court paraſites, but one who can make what has been an expence to other princes, turn finally to his advantage, to his honour, and to the intereſt of his country; opening a trade by the canal of Oſtend, and through a tract of his own dominions into Germany; not that this point is ſo very clear as may be at firſt ſight imagined, but it however exhibits to our view a character meriting the higheſt regard: an example worthy the imitation of every ſovereign, and whom every ſubject of whatever nation may behold with pleaſure.

This ſcheme is therefore not ſo much to be regarded in the general plan, as in the conducting of it to a criſis, through a

courſe of ſecrecy and addreſs peculiar to the king of Pruſſia; for altho' the acquiſition of country may be very certain, it is not quite ſo certain that any conſiderable trade will be thereby obtained. The attempt, however, is truly noble, and if it doth not ſucceed to his utmoſt wiſh, will very well anſwer the purpoſe of a ſubſidial treaty to Great Britain and to Hanover; to both which nations, it may in the hands of his Pruſſian majeſty, become ſuch a frontier as the arms of France will never be able to penetrate. But hence follows a very natural enquiry, why the troops of our old ally the queen of Hungary were not preferably employed to thoſe of Ruſſia, as they were nearer, and conſequently more ready for ſervice? To this an anſwer has been already publicly given, in a place where things of this nature are more particularly attended to, "that the Ruſ-"ſians perform their contracts better;" which I verily believe, but I think that is not the true, at leaſt, not the only reaſon.

To come at the truth, we muſt reflect a little back, and conſider, whether any man in his ſenſes, would truſt to the aid

of

of his neighbour in the acquiſition of new dominions, who had before acquired from ſuch neighbour, what was not willingly parted with. In this light it may eaſily be concluded, that the Ruſſians were to be prefered, and as nothing more was required from us than ſuch ſubſidiary troops, and the advantage probably to reſult ſufficiently evident, it only remained on our part, to conſider how far we could afford to engage. But on the part of the king of Pruſſia there were various other conſiderations, as he could not, perhaps, be truſted with the command of the Hungarian troops, or perhaps, he might not chuſe to truſt himſelf with the command of them, and it may perhaps be, that he neither approved of their muſter rolls, or diſcipline.

A prince that is his own general, his own miniſter, his own treaſurer, with an underſtanding ſuited, is not to be played with, like thoſe under a different courſe of oeconomy; no favourites under him make indirect acquiſition; no diviſion and ſubdiviſion of the public wealth amongſt commiſſaries and courtiers; what he beſtows is the ample reward, and while the receiver

receiver gratefully accepts, the prince condeſcends to acknowledge his merit, it being equally to his honour to give where it is proper, as it is for the receiver to underſtand the propriety and value of the gift. But as to perquiſits out of the public appropriations, and thereby inſtead of a real, a nominal army appears in the field, the ſhadow or ghoſt of an army, in no ſenſe ſuits the maxims which direct this prince's conduct: therefore, I repeat again, it may be a reaſon why the Ruſſians are to be prefer'd, as the court of Peterſburgh is not yet abſorped in the corruption and venality common to many other European ſtates. Thus the Ruſſians by a ſimilarity of conduct, by their order, diſcipline, cloathing, exact obſervance of their engagements, punctuality of numbers, &c. effectually ſuit this prince's purpoſe, in preference to any other, and likewiſe the purpoſe of all who are mutually engaged.

There is another reaſon that may ſeem a little ludicrous, but has at the bottom ſomething really ſubſtantial in it; it is, that a peace as naturally follows a treaty with the Ruſſians, as an increaſe of penſions,

ſions, an increaſe of the civil liſt, or, as an accumulate expence ſucceeds a vote of credit; but the reaſon of this is not perhaps, ſo generally underſtood. A good old woman of my acquaintance who has travelled in France, and, as the phraſe is, ſeen the world, informs me of a prophecy, which makes every Frenchman as well as every Turk, ſtartle at the name of Ruſſian. If ſo, how much more is their approach to be dreaded, and ſtill, how much more is our miniſtry to be applauded, who have found out the ſecret of terrifying the court of France into reaſon.

But as this terror of the French has not been yet ſo attended to, as to draw any happy concluſions therefrom, if our miniſtry are ſtill in the ſame road of thinking, it will naturally lead us to enquire, what is to become of the king of Pruſſia's pretenſions? and what of our affairs in America? and finally the public debt. This laſt article calls upon us to be very ſerious, and the others I conceive, ſufficiently merit our attention.

I ſhall leave the Pruſſian intereſt to be conſidered another way, and at preſent only attend to the latter articles; and as firſt

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in order, of America, which I ſhall treat on the ſuppoſitions of a peace, and of a war, as it equally concerns us that ſomething effectual be done therein, which way ſoever the hand of the political dial ſhall turn.

The firſt point as to America, is to confine the French within proper bounds; the next to take ſuch meaſures, and form ſuch an eſtabliſhment, as may keep them for the future within ſuch bounds.

This eſtabliſhment is preſumed to be beſt effected, by the varying of the preſent form, and ſubjecting the whole tract of colonies, under one and the ſame governor, indiſtinct of all proprietary right, or private claim whatſoever. For which purpoſe, a ſcheme has been handed about, as a barrel thrown out of the ſhip of ſtate, for the amuſement of that huge leviathan the people, which has however, rather ſet them a ſtaring than determined any thing: every body thinks it means ſomething, but as they don't rightly know what, they therefore conclude nothing, and ſo leave it as they found it.

There ſeems, at firſt ſight, to be a kind of ſoleciſm in the propoſition, and many in the propoſed ſcheme. I do not ſo much

trouble myſelf whether this ſcheme is a true one, preſented to the miniſtry, the project of the miniſtry themſelves, or the reſult of ſome inventive brain to amuſe us, or whether in the nature and reaſon of things aught of this kind be practicable.

To thoroughly underſtand this, it is neceſſary to conſider, whether in the common courſe of human affairs, the cuſtomary method of governors conducting themſelves, will not moſt probably be the ſame hereafter, as heretofore; and whether, as the means of acquiring wealth may be greater than at preſent, men of a higher intereſt, and ſuch as cannot eaſily be called to an account, will not be thoſe employed. At the ſame time it ſeems ſtrange, that any colony ſhould expect to have their government more in the hands or power of the people, than is the conſtitution of their parental dam, by which they have been nurſed and ſupported, unleſs the ſcheme be to ſet the happineſs of the colony in ſo diſtinguiſhed a light, as may charm over to them the inhabitants of their mother country, and to raiſe one: in effect, unpeople the other, drawing the

main ſtrength from its natural ſituation, and weakning the baſis on which it ſtands conſtructed. And yet it is plain, that either ſome ſuch kind of government muſt be eſtabliſhed, or the ſame inconveniency attend a general, as is the caſe at preſent of each individual government. Nor matters it as to the main queſtion where the blame is, in the miniſtry, here, in their deputy there, or in the inhabitants, as the ſame cannot poſſibly be remedied by enlarging the bounds of power in either; and if the only end propoſed, is as pretended to form a proper union againſt the French, I think there needeth not this extraordinary meaſure to attain it, and ſeems to me at the ſame time to be diametrically oppoſite to the fundamental principles whereon the ſcheme is built, as the enlarging of power, and narrowing of employments appears not, in any ſenſe, propoſed thereby; unleſs they mean to have a governor or viceroy, whom they may govern, inſtead of the crown, and diſpoſe of all employments of the ſtate as is cuſtomary in an independant common wealth, under an imaginary or nominal regent. If this be intended, they were better incor-

porated,

porated, electing a doge out of their own body, as I ſee not any reaſon why the government here ſhould bear the expence, when the colony aſſumes all the power to themſelves.

Plutarch tells us, that the government of Lacedæmon founded all their notions of juſtice on the agrandiſing of the ſtate; therefore, the uſeful was the lawful. It was the ſame at Athens, at Thebes, &c. nor is it eaſy to ſay where it is not ſo; the policies of ſtates are not governed by the maxims of private men, as the latter queſtions the juſtice, the former only the utility of an action; in which lights, the intereſts of ſtates and that of individuals will ever ſtand contraſted, and both too commonly wander into the extremes, the one attempting to govern arbitrarily, the other not to be governed at all, which ſeems to be a good deal the caſe now before us, as the propoſitions tend to make the general governor no governor at all, and is contriving to form a union amongſt people not diſunited, while they ſeem only deſirous to be ſo unioned as not in effect to be under any government except a tyranny of their own erection. Now the beauty of

the British conſtitution conſiſts in this, that neither ſhall the king tyrannize over the people, nor the people over one another: and why this is not better than any new-fangled whims of government, modelled from the unpractiſed notions of Plato or Harrington, is to be made appear. We ſaw in 1648, what jargon ſuch a chaos of conceptions produced at home, and what better are we to hope from abroad, where the ſame kind of people will principally preſide, for they already ſay, that they would chuſe to be governed by a new ſyſtem, yet conſent that their laws be the ſame as in England; that is to ſay, as near as may be, not ſeeming to apprehend, that ſyſtems and laws are calculated to ſuit each other, or that the beſt ſyſtems are evidently but mere theory, until their utility be confirmed by long experience; and why experiments are to be made at the expence of time, when all kind of governments have been conſidered, and at different times and places practiſed, is not eaſy to be conceived. Therefore, whenever I ſee a ſcheme the mere reſult of fancy, and which has only been thought of in a ſingle light, I conclude the ſame is thrown out as mere

matter

matter of amuſement, to employ the writer, and divert the reader.

If a general governor be thought on, the plan is very eaſy and clear; the diſtinct governments and governors may remain as before, and when the wealth of the reſpective province is calculated, it is not difficult to allot them their quotas. The moſt power that can reaſonably be veſted in the ſupreme, is to preſide in the great council, and execute the laws made by the people, and ſanctified by the parliament of Great Britain, or as is done in ſimilar caſes by the king in council.

Some difficulties will naturally occur in the allotment of quotas, not as to their preſent ſituation, for that may be eaſy enough, but from their probable growth or improvement, by which one may vaſtly out-run the other, and when double the extent of ground and number of people will pay no more than at firſt. This the ſcheme hints ſome kind of remedy for, which is to have the number of repreſentatives proportioned to the quota; but this doth not remedy the poſſibility, that ſome may rather be without repreſentatives, than at any expence, when it will happen, as in

our land-tax, that the diſproportion will increaſe with the ſucceſs and induſtry of the planters, and the value of one thouſand pounds a year, pay leſs in one place, than four hundred in another; as is the caſe now of our northern and ſouthern counties, the former being improving, the other long ſince improved to the utmoſt; ſo it muſt happen in the colonies, where we have ſeen Penſylvania make a better acquiſition in fifty, than Virginia in two hundred years; and the remedy of the proportion not ſo ready as may a firſt ſight appear.

For if the tax is laid immediately as the land improves, it may mar induſtry, and impede ſuch improvement, and to aſcertain when otherwiſe it ſhould be laid, is the preſent difficulty; but however, rather difficult than impracticable.

There is beſides, a vaſt variety of matter which ſchemers rarely reflect on, and which thoroughly to diſcuſs, would be too extended for the preſent bounds of this deſign; but there is one article that ſeems ſo much ſuperior to the reſt, as to require our principal attention, who is to have the direction of the public money? I remem-

ber

ber in the readings on the reign of Charles the ſecond, that the parliament took the diſpoſition of the public money on themſelves, and ordered it into the chamber of London, and then not well knowing what to do with it, ordered it back again to the treaſury. It is certain, that the moſt a body of people can do to have the public money well diſpoſed of, is to ſubject the perſon truſted to account: but here lyes the great difficulty; there is a kind of neceſſity that conſiderable ſums be occaſionally applied, the knowledge whereof is not to be opened in a public aſſembly. This, here, iſſues from the civil liſt, ſo not accountable for to parliament; and if a like allowance be made to a general governour in America, it is not very material who diſpoſes of the reſt, tho' even that may produce inconveniencies not at firſt perceived.

The diſpoſition of public money, where the accounts are open and obvious, can be no otherwiſe abenefit to either the government or the aſſembly, than in the requiſite employments, whereto they may recommend their friends; and as ſuch a number of people are but little likely to agree, it ſeems moſt

moſt proper that it falls under the direction of one, and who that one muſt be is ſufficiently apparent, as it would ſeem a ſtrange thing to be at the head of a government, and the offices under it at the diſpoſition of others, becauſe they invigorate the active power, without which power, pre-eminence is ridiculous.

I am as ſenſible as any man can be, of the abuſe of power, and of the artful miſapplications of the public money independant of what is given without account: but this is a diſtemper in the body politic, like that of the gout in the body natural, rather to be eaſed than cured. If we have the example before us of rapacious miniſters, and avaritious kings, ſo have we of commonwealths, where the abuſe is ſtill higher: wherever the people delegate power, it is to make themſelves ſlaves to that power, and like a flock of ſheep to be occaſionally fleeced. But as without this power they would ſtill be worſe, ſome inveſtment muſt be; and if any are ſo wiſe, as to be able to ſhew us, by clear and convincing proofs a better model, in practice, than our own, they would do well to declare it, for the common benefit of mankind.

Mr. Pope was pretty near the mark when he concluded, that is beſt which is beſt adminiſtred. In my humble opinion, untill men are angels, there is but little better or worſe in any of them: the honeſt man is generally a weak man in the buſineſs of the world, and the cunning man always a thief. If the prince happens to be a man very knowing, he uſually chuſes a good honeſt ſimple perſon for his miniſter, as his uſe is only to do as he is bid, and to ſtand between him and the people; and if a good honeſt ſimple prince, the cunning ſtateſman ſteps in and unguards him, and inſtead of being ſo ſtationed himſelf, ſets the prince between him and the people.

For my part, it appears to me clearly, the people of Great Britain, &c. are leſs plundered than moſt other nations; as little as miniſters from time to time can poſſibly afford; and when things are carried a good deal farther than ſome people like, it muſt be conſidered, that altho' the eagle ſits on the rock and is ſeemingly adored, yet it is the cormorants that batten on the moor, and devour moſt of the provender.

Commonwealths are uſually more rapacious than even abſolute monarchies; at

leaſt, ſo it appears in moſt we know, otherwiſe the difference is only, that commonwealths preſcribe for themſelves, while in mixt monarchies the governing party are often ſo modeſt, as to leave it to their leader's diſcretion in what manner he will uſe his diſpenſing power, and in abſolute monarchies the prince and his miniſters commonly ſhare.

Utopia is a very fine country, and our Americans much inclined to travel that way; but it is like ſome of the regions in romance, that vaniſh at mortal appearances. The beſt government, is that which does the moſt good, and leaſt miſchief. No prince, let his heart be ever ſo bad, can injure the people, materially, but by their own connivance; and the beſt rule to judge of a form of government, is, by the reputation that time has ſtamped on it: the experience of a ſingle century will ſhew any ſenſible defects, which if not to be remedied without ſhocking the baſis, muſt be ſuffered to ſubſiſt, tho' evidently prejudicial, and all colonies ſubject to ſuch government, participate equally of the good and evil; but more eſpecially when it cannot be clearly determined, either what

what appears ſo, be really an evil, or if really an evil, much time will be required to prove, that it is to be cured by the remedy propoſed.

Men of warm imaginations are generally fond of any opinion, that at the firſt appearance gives them a proſpect of rectitude, as they naturally love to mend every thing but themſelves: ſtruck with the conception, are a little too apt to determine before they think; and without examining in how many lights an opinion is ſubject to be varied, peremptorily reſolve to-day, on what to-morrow they find reaſon enough to ſee they have been miſtaken.

Theſe are men of principle, but there are others ever railing at government, not that they want it amended, but to be in the way of making it worſe. Both theſe are poſſeſſed with the ſame whims and purſue the like meaſures, tho' with very different views. It was a very honeſt anſwer of Oliver Cromwell, when demanded of him, what he would have done towards the rectification of government; "I know "not what I would have, but I very well "know what I would not have." The run of mankind are more preſuming; they

know both what they would, and what they would not have, and therefore bewilder themſelves in imaginary projects, otherwiſe it is plain enough, that they would not have the French interrupt their induſtry, or interfere in their trade; they would not have venal governors, nor would they be at a loſs for a proper united ſtrength, when the encroachments of the French call upon them to exert their beſt abilities; but the way to obtain theſe ends, they are not, perhaps, extremely clear in, it being more than probable, that while ſo many different intereſts claſh, the means may be better underſtood than purſued: For if the natives expect to be under leſs reſtraint, or a different form of government than their parent country, the proprietors expect an unreaſonable equivalent, and ſome here more power than really they ought to have, either all muſt be given up to the latter, or as to the form, all things continue as they are. But if no alteration ſhould be in the form of government, a common treaſury may be eſtabliſhed, for the mutual benefit and protection of the reſpective colonies; in ſome caſes the diſpoſition ſpecifically directed, and in others applied by the

the reſpective governours or their deputies in council aſſembled at ſome proper place, neareſt the center of the whole.

I ſpeak not this, as I would be thought either to direct, or adviſe, but merely as an intimation that a general governour is not abſolutely neceſſary, and a matter of ſome conſideration, whether ſafe, or proper; at all events this ſeems a point not neceſſary to be reſolved on, until it may with the ſame degree of certainty be known, whether we are to continue the war, or ſhall be ſuddenly ſurpriſed into a peace.

It has been partly ſtated how the war is likely to turn on the behalf of either nation, and it may be freely remarked here, that a peace on right principles will probably be the beſt for both, ſuppoſing only the money account in queſtion; for while it is doubtful which can hold out longeſt, in ſeems clearly the intereſt of both, not to put it to the hazard if it can be fairly avoided; but how to adjuſt ſuch a peace, is attended with difficulties that are not to be eaſily ſurmounted.

To ſtate this matter right, we muſt allow ſomething to the reaſoning of our adverſaries, as well as to our own; their views

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are very probably what we ſuſpect, and we with reaſon ſay, that as experience has demonſtrated what kind of people they are, and how covetous of their neighbour's property in Europe, we have certainly a right to conclude that the genius and temperature of their conduct, will not vary much on their being tranſported into America, and therefore are to be neceſſarily on our guard, and to avoid being eternally perplext with litigious diſputes about our boundaries, it is neceſſary once for all to have them perfectly ſettled, without which a peace will be extremely idle, and theſe boundaries not left to future deciſion, but actually included in the peace; as a future deciſion, is no deciſion at all, and an aſſembly of commiſſaries the mere objects of amuſement. The French, on their part, complain that we extend our claims beyond all bounds of reaſon; that the lands which they occupy with the conſent of the natives, are neither within our precincts, nor ſo near as to become dangerous; and that it ſeems very hard to be eſteemed enemies, becauſe they manage their colony affairs better than the Engliſh.

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The people of England have been told another ſtory, that the French are fortifying within the colony precincts, and conſequently propoſe, in due time, to become maſters of the whole.

Now if the French believe what they ſay, and the Engliſh credit what they are told, it muſt follow, that in order to a peace, the French will deviate from what they aſſert, or the Engliſh conſent to, and conſequently eſtabliſh the French claim, in its utmoſt extent, as has been heretofore done, to what they poſſeſs in Canada, at Cape Breton, and at Newfoundland. In either of which lights, the event ſeems doubtful to thoſe who are not any way informed, by what myſterious ſteps our ſtateſmen propoſe to aſcend into the temple of peace with public approbation.

A war in public, is like a litigious chancery ſuit in private life, much eaſier engaged in, than handſomely concluded; commenced in a pet, and finiſhed in a fit of deſpair. Men whoſe abilities are not of ſufficient extent to take in the whole compaſs of things, nor form ſuch a plan in the outſet, as may enable him to make a fair judgment of the event, are like children

playing at blind-man's-buff, where the blinded perſon diverts the reſt with graſping at ſhadows. A juſt war judiciouſly entered into, by being properly prepared, is proved in the conſequence, by a happy peace; and a fooliſh concluſion points out to us the direct contrary; as few people will be perſuaded that when affairs turn out unhappily, it is owing to fate or accident.

The war, or ſomething like a war, we are now engaged in, has the public approbation; the plan by which it is to be concluded, or the real end propoſed, is not I preſume known to many; the execution, in part, has been hitherto generally approved, in part not, as the nature of diſputing with the French in America may not have been ſo well underſtood, as in Europe; and the only defect in the general plan ſeems to have been, the not ſupplying of the Americans in time with proper requiſites. As it is, they ſeem to have no objection to the continuing of the war, ſo long as they can be well ſupplied, nor do I find that the Engliſh at home are in a different diſpoſition. This turn of the people in favour of the miniſterial ſchemes,

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ſo far gives them a kind of right, if they had no other, to demand a very good peace, a peace as ſalutary, as ſound and permanent; a peace that may do honour to our arms and councils; a peace that may give a ſpirit to trade, and vigour to our commerce, that may inform our adverſaries that we do not underſtand there is any material difference, between lying on the back of our colonies and intercepting our inland trade, and that of directly attempting to diveſt us of them: finally, ſuch a peace, as on our part this century has not been acquainted with, that has as little ſimilitude to Utrecht, and Aix-la-Chapelle, to triple, and quadruple and quinquiple alliances, or any other kind of treaties, proviſoes, truces, miniſterial, embaſſadorial, commiſſarial, or otherwiſe; however, as poſſible, and what the people expect; it is hoped, they may once in a century or two, be obliged in, if it was for no other reaſon, than that they pay for it.

There is another reaſon, perhaps, as important as any I have mentioned; why, if a peace be made, we ſhould be extremely ſecure, that it may not be eaſily broken;

which is, that on the concluſion, we ſhall have a flood of ſeamen, or of men that have been ſome time at ſea; as likewiſe, of diſbanded ſoldiers, totally unprovided for, as has ever been the caſe on the like occaſions. Theſe, muſt generally, either go abroad, or plunder at home; if the former proves the moſt eligible, and the court of France chuſes to entertain them, they may beſides their own ſeamen returned, engage, perhaps, twenty or thirty thouſand of ours, and by ſurpriſing us with a new war, turn the tables upon us. This, I believe, the reader will allow to be no chimera, and it may be ſtill worſe, if the money alloted ſhould be otherwiſe employed, and not ready to diſcharge them with; as then the load will continue, though the war ends.

But the gratifying the people is not the only particular to be conſidered in concluding a peace; for would we make Britain for the future eaſy, our frontiers on the ſide of Germany muſt be ſecured, Holland barriered, and the king of Pruſſia ſo well eſtabliſhed in the Netherlands, as that with the aid of proper ſubſidies, there may not be any future occaſion for other troops, than what he will be able to ſup-

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ply out of his own dominions, Hanover, Holland, and Great Britain. It may indeed happen, that ſome other prince of that race, may by this means, become maſter of both Holland and Hanover; but as this is only a diſtant proſpect, ſhould it ever ſo happen, it would only ſtrengthen his hands againſt France, and by being maſter of the Hanover mines, and rich trading provinces of the Low Countries; he would then be our defender, without having any ſubſidial demands on Great Britain; the fortreſſes of France would ſhrink before him, like the ſenſitive plant at the approach of a mortal hand; the imperial troops, at his direction, would break in through Lorrain, Bar, and Alſatia, France be reduced to its primitive narrowneſs, and univerſal monarchy be for a time, interred in the Gallic ruins.

In reſpect to America many other difficulties occur, not more eaſily ſurmounted than thoſe previouſly reaſoned upon. The deſire of graſping at more than we can enjoy, is the common fatality of our natures, and equally the foible of the prince and the people: it is policy to acquire from our neighbours, leſt they ſhould gain up-

on us, but it is ſimply avarice that induces us to deſire what neither our neighbours poſſeſs, nor we ourſelves can enjoy; and if this be thought of, to guard againſt future contingencies, I ſee not why, with a like parity of reaſoning, we may not deſtroy all the ſhipping on the ocean, to prevent, ſome hundred years hence, our being invaded, is ſomething like the happy reflection of a tenant in reverſion, after the determination of a thouſand years leaſe, pleaſed to think that his poſterity ſhall one day enjoy a fine income.

Such thoughts in favour of poſterity, would be of great importance in human life, were they leſs partial and confined; could we turn this avarice of individuals to public utility, or their fears and cares about what may never happen, into a due activity and proviſion againſt probable events, ſuch a peace might be procured for them, as could not be reaſonably objected to: but as matters now are circumſtanced on both ſides, it is not eaſy to conceive, how either the French or Engliſh are to be gratified to the extent of their reſpective wiſhes, the latter to enjoy in full ſecurity all their claim, and the former to have free

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leave to range over millions of acres they can never propoſe the cultivating a foot; and if both may not be ſo gratified, it is probable that both will deſire a continuance of the war. A ſucceſsful war cannot be the fate of both, and for either now to make a diſadvantageous peace, will be placing themſelves in the center of a whirlwind: I am very well appriſed of what the people ſay here, and into the reaſonableneſs of this event I ſhall now enquire.

There has been within the preſent century, various treaties, negotiations, conventions, &c. There has been the peace of Utrecht, and the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle; the latter two, I ſhall only at preſent, make ſome ſlight remarks upon. The former of them was made by the Torys, and therefore amongſt other reaſons, condemned by the Whiggs; the latter was made by the Whiggs, and therefore amongſt other reaſons, condemned by the Torys, and both alike bad in the current opinion of the people, becauſe, ſay they, the latter was made upon exactly the ſame principles, as the former was found fault with for, that is to ſay, ſeemingly from a fear of reducing

cing the French too low; but they likewiſe at the ſame time rcollect, that in the firſt, we had great advantages over the French by land, in the latter, by ſea: that in the one we acquired Gibraltar, Minorca, St. Kits, and the demolition of Dunkirk; in the other, we aſſured the enemy we would deliver them what ſhould be agreed upon. The eclat in theſe reſpective particulars was evidently diſtinguiſhable, and produces at laſt, ſome reflections on the honour of the nation, that may not be quite ſo prudent for me to exhibit. The enquiry from hence, is, how ſhall we manage to make another peace like the former, and yet quiet the minds of the people? becauſe they will be apt to reflect, that as the public debt is encreaſed, and to ſupport that with honour, the taxes as high as they can well bear, and the nation no better ſecured againſt future inſults than formerly; what muſt our taxes be in caſe of anotherwar? The lowering of intereſt farther, will not in any ſenſe anſwer the purpoſe, for as that is the ſame thing as annihilating, our credit will not on future emergencies be duly reſpected; and this

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I ſhould think nearly equal to an unhappy peace.

The taxing of the public funds is much the ſame as lowering the intereſt; the levelling of a land-tax, or making it every where equal, would be in the opinion of the majority, the ſame as mounting it above four ſhillings in the pound, which they who are burthened ſay, is as much as the land will bear. And as no other tax can be laid, that will not equally affect the landed intereſt, nor, in an uncertain ſtate, any more income from our commerce, it ſhould ſeem that if we are left to our option, it may be thought more eligible by many, rather to hazard being ruined by a war, than to be certainly deſtroyed by inexertion. This is, in truth, a miſerable alternative, but what muſt a man do that is ſurrounded by thieves? he muſt either break the band, or ſubmit to their mercy.

This is only to ſhew what would probably reſult from a peace at this critical juncture, if any ſuch thing ſhould be on bad terms attempted: we rejoiced in tears for the laſt, but however bad a war may in its nature be, another ſuch peace, except

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by unavoidable neceſſity, will bring from us tears of blood; and therefore it is generally concluded, that the miniſtry are very clear in the game they have to play, or would not have ſo ſingularly deviated from their former ſyſtems. That Pruſſia is more than merely engaged in our intereſt, and that ſuch his engagements will not only be ſupported by Great Britain, but by two other powers, either of which, when exerting their beſt abilities, ſingly a match for France; and as it is likewiſe preſumed that his Sardinian majeſty has a ſhare in the ſame meaſures, it is not eaſily imagined upon what foundation France can reaſonably build any hopes of ſucceſs, as that nation muſt herein prove herſelf an overmatch for all Europe, when perhaps, it is equally clear, that either Ruſſia, the Empire, or Great Britain may ſeverally be on a parity with her. If then ſhe is without allies to balance the powers, and at the ſame time, two other princes of no light conſequence intereſted in the common cauſe, it ſeems at leaſt probable, that France will have too much buſineſs at home, to interfere in our American conteſts; and that ſhe cannot have any allies, ſeems

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equally probable from the following remarkable circumſtances.

While the courts of Vienna and Berlin are in the ſame intereſt, and the Ruſſians always ready to enter the empire, it is difficult to conceive whence any power can ſpring on that ſide in favour of France; and as in the preſent ſituation of affairs, Tuſcany may be re-changed for Lorrain, &c. in favour of a younger branch of the Spaniſh monarchy, and Rouſillon recovered to the elder, to be effected by no other means than the preſent grand alliance, it neceſſarily follows, that the court of Spain will fall into the ſame intereſt, becauſe the advantage is evident, and the intereſt mutual.

The reſource of France, and what can only buoy her up with any hopes of extricating herſelf from the preſent dilemma, conſiſts in two particulars, the one certain and evident, the other uncertain; the former is her own native power, wealth and addreſs; the latter, the aid of the Ottoman Port: it does not yet appear, how this laſt is at preſent adjuſted, but ſuppoſing it happens, it is diſtant and disjoined, and powers equal thereto remain in petto, to

be occaſionally ſpirited up and engaged. And as to the compact ſituation of France, good management, good armys, and an immenſity of fortifications, no doubt, will ſtand her in great ſtead; yet are the engagements againſt her ſo ſtrong, that unleſs ſhe can with her uſual art, break the chain of the alliance, human foreſight can hardly perceive wherein her preſervation conſiſts.

I ſhall mention one thing more, and that perhaps, the moſt material in favour of France: it is to be remembered, that it has heretofore been the common caſe, ſo indolently to drill on an advantageous war, as to make it too great a burthen to be borne: if this ſhould happen now, France will at length be an over-match for us at home, had we double the armys propoſed. We have hitherto treated her with the tenderneſs of a young virgin; ſhe muſt now be attacked like a widow in her bloom, boarded at once, as the ſeamen, or ſtormed as the landmen phraſe it, and if it ſhall prove, that our allies are for lengthening out the war, France is ſtill as ſafe as if no ſuch alliance had ever been.

Some men may reaſon, that our finances will hold out as long as thoſe of France;

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I anſwer poſitively no, not that we have leſs wealth, but ſhall expend infinitely more, if the difference was only, that ours muſt travel abroad, theirs remain at home. And it will be the ſame in America as in Europe, if what is propoſed, is not purſued with ſpirit, and to the utmoſt extent of our powers; it is the criſis of our fate, or the fate of France, Delenda eſt Carthago, one muſt neceſſarily fall; but it would concern every Engliſhman that it ſhall be our turn, merely for want of ſeizing the preſent moment, when all human aid ſeems to concur in our favour, and from whence we may have reaſon to promiſe our ſelves higher aſſiſtance, if we act as becomes us.

The charm which has ſo long ſuſpended us to the view and amazement of Europe, that has hung us up in the chains of puſillanimity, and raviſhed from us a reputation the work of ages, is at length diſſolved, thoſe halcyon days in proſpect, ſo long contended for, and with ſo much ſollicitude deſired, by that part of the nation who have nothing to do with the nonſenſe of parties. From this any miniſtry may ſee how much they will always be honou-

red, who thus convince the people, that they neither want wiſdom, nor inclination to ſerve their country.

England is not ſeeking after acquiſition or extent of dominion in Europe, but aiming to obtain ſuch frontiers, and putting them in ſuch hands as may be beſt enabled to guard our liberties and ſecure our trade, by making the intereſt of Britain the common intereſt of her allies, gratifying them with lands and towns, and by ſuch gratifications, guaranteing and preſerving her own wealth, eaſe, and importance. And while it is the apparent intereſt of each to contribute to her happineſs, they will be too wiſe to renounce an alliance ſo eminently a common benefit.

Spain, no doubt, has farther views than at firſt ſight appears, as it will hardly be preſumed that nation can ſee with pleaſure, ſo potent a people as the French, gradually attempting to force from her the mines of Mexico; nor on the other ſide, can the king of Pruſſia with pleaſure, obſerve a power growing upon the Empire, that his poſterity may have reaſonable expectation one day to govern. Sardinia, as matters have hitherto ſtood, has always

always been at the mercy of France, the king of the Sicilies little better than a ſubject of that crown, and the Dutch bandied about like a ſhuttle-cock. The Ruſſian government cannot eaſily forget the practices of her agents, nor Saxony, what that electorate has ſuffered? In ſhort, the ravages in the Palatinate, the ruin of the Barrier towns, and the known public inſults on the court of Vienna, call upon fate to interweave reſentment with intereſt, and by the united force and power of them all, to level France with the meaneſt of her neighbours.

As upon this plan it is to be preſumed that the king of Pruſſia is to have territorial dominion to the Germanic ocean, Sardinia, from the weſtern confines of the Milaneſe to the Mediteranean, the younger branch of Spain, augmentation of lands in Italy, the elder recovery of long loſt countrys, and the emperor be enabled to reſume his native rights, naturally falling into the houſe of Auſtria; ſo will France by this means be properly bounded, yet with ſufficient intereſt in Europe for the good of the people, but at the ſame time, the curb ſufficiently ſevere on the crown as to prevent

vent for the future any proſpect of triumphing over its neighbours, which has hitherto rather contributed to decorate that crown with dear purchaſed jewels, than been of any benefit to its ſubjects, whoſe blood, treaſure, and liberties have all been ſacrificed to the vain ideal purſuits of univerſal monarchy.

Hence it ſhould ſeem, that this important alliance is not only calculated for the ſecurity of the reſpective intereſted ſtates, but alſo for the common good of mankind; and while it confines France within due bounds, it barriers all Europe againſt that once riſing power by whoſe aſſiſtance France has been hitherto enabled to carry her dangerous projects into execution. And however it may ſeem, that we are extending our views beyond even the boundarys of knight errantry, it is yet undoubtedly true, and the effect will probably be, that Perſia will one day ſhare herein, and maintain a power in oppoſition to that of the Ottomans, to the like purpoſe as the Ottomans have been uſed by France againſt the houſe of Auſtria; and how much farther this ſcheme may yet extend, I ſhall wave for the preſent mentioning, as I would

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not ſeem to amuſe the reader with matter, thatmay rather amaze and confound, than inſtruct or inform him.

As to the affairs of Germany in particular, I need not add that Cologne muſt follow the intereſt of Bavaria, or that Bavaria is not in condition to interrupt the common intereſt of the empire, and of the alliance; on the contrary, muſt neceſſarily court and cheriſh it, as the natural means of its own preſervation.

I am not aware that hence will ſpring a new proteſtant electorate, and two powerful monarchies, nor that France will inſinuate to the Dutch and Genoeſe, that they muſt one day change their maſters; but this admitted, it will not be to the prejudice of either. As it is the common intereſt of mankind, that neither be for the future governed by the politics of France, as upon the bottom they are neither can long ſubſiſt; and while it is almoſt impoſſible for any ſovereign to govern the Dutch but upon free principle, ſo neither can Genoa ſuffer a maſter long but on the like principles; and it is more than probable that the ſubjects of both will generally agree, that it is better to be under ſome regular,

compact and uniform government, than in effect under none at all; for as of all things, confuſion is the worſt, as that is the preſent ſtate of Genoa, and only checked in Holland by the houſe of Orange, ſhould that family fail, all their affairs will probably return to their former diſorder; and as they muſt neceſſarily become the prey of ſome power, they will doubtleſs conclude that power beſt who is of their own religion, and moſt likely to continue them a free ſtate. As to their becoming the ſubjects of Great Britain, which may be invidiouſly intimated, it can neither be the intereſt, or inclination of either; as if I may ſo ſpeak, ſuch concord will naturally produce a diſcord, that may eventually deſtroy that harmonious union, ſo long amicably ſubſiſting between the two nations, and which is more likely to ſubſiſt in ſeparate, than in connected power.

On the event of this, if it proves as fortunate as human reaſon may preſume, the trade of Europe will probably in a courſe of time take quite a new turn, when the beauty of our conduct may conſiſt in artfully improving our own, while we turn that of France into a new channel, depending

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ing perhaps, more on good laws well executed at home, than on any other arts or attainments. But as this, I hope, is the main end in proſpect, ſo it intimately concerns us to conſider, that if the preſent refined, or rather ſolid, politics take place for the common advantage, we may not be ſo wanting to our ſelves, in a due courſe of laudable induſtry, and honourable dealings, that while we may make ſo diſtinguiſhed a figure in the world, by being the main inſtrument in reducing the power of France, we ſhall not have occaſion to quarrel, on account of trade, with thoſe who have aſſiiſted us herein; otherwiſe, this, inſtead of being a happy, may prove a fatal criſis, and we be again reduced to the miſerable neceſſity of raiſing that power to our aid, whom we are now aiming to reduce, and again put into their hands the ſcales of Europe, whom we are now endeavouring to exclude from any ſhare in the common balance.

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